One principal intersection between democratization, armed conflict and governance is the immediate post-conflict period. This is a time when a number of key challenges need to be addressed simultaneously, among them security and preventing a return to violence, reestablishing political institutions and enabling them to become vehicles for effective governance, re-launching economic activity and often refashioning a war economy based on illicit or even criminal practices into a modern market economy, disarming and demobilizing former fighters and reintegrating them into society (not least by finding employment possibilities for them), as well as addressing war-time abuses through national reconciliation and transitional justice measures.

These are huge challenges and it is no surprise that democratic regimes often come under heavy strain following the end of armed violence. For “young” or emerging democracies this is even more acute, if only because they have little or no experience with democratic rule dating back to the pre-war period. To add another layer of complexity, adopting democracy as a form of governance often goes hand in hand with a transition to a market economy – though this is not automatic and both are conceptually distinct – leading to fundamental changes not just in the political realm but also in economic, social, and even cultural terms. The way in which post-war democratic systems respond to these multiple challenges – and the constraints and limitations they face in doing so – fundamentally affect the trajectories democratic transitions can take. All too often initial enthusiasm for democracy is quickly replaced by growing disillusionment, made worse when fledgling democratic regimes are incapable of reigning in the corruption and public insecurity so typical of post-war settings, let alone addressing structural conflict drivers such as poverty or ethnic discrimination.

Fundamentally, democratic political systems still offer the best chance of preventing armed conflict (or its recurrence), since they permit the mediation of competing interests through institutional channels and – at least over time – the redistribution of resources, power, and opportunities. In principle, that is, since many democratic regimes democracies “get stuck” somewhere along the way and never manage to become sufficiently consolidated. Such “semi-democracies” are actually more conflict-prone than either autocracies or full-fledged democracies, essentially because they open up spaces for contestation but fail to provide institutional mechanisms for effective interest mediation (recent events in the Andean region of Latin America, such as in Ecuador or Bolivia, are a good example). As Tom Carothers has argued, this state of affairs is increasingly common around the world; in fact, it would be wrong to assume that a linear transition from autocratic to democratic rule is the norm.

It is useful in this context to make a conceptual distinction between democratization and peacebuilding (both pre- and post-conflict): while they do intersect, they also respond to different logics. Democratization at its root aims to broaden the space for political participation and therefore citizenship, including for those that were previously denied it. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, is chiefly concerned with stability and often reluctant to embrace change. Reconciling these different goals can be a challenge whose success depends crucially on the actions of local players, as well as careful calibration and sequencing of appropriate policies.

The relation among the three is not as clear cut as we would like to think, at least depending on the definition of the concepts I am using here.

Democracy denotes a political system characterized by formal separation of powers, the accountability of the executive and the legislature to the citizens via elections, and the respect for basic principles of human rights and individual freedoms

Good governance is defined as the capacity of the government, at all levels, to provide maintain law and order, regulate the economy, and provide services to the population

Armed conflict is defined here as conflict in which the government takes part as well as conflict among non-state actors

Democracy-good governance Democracy and good governance do not always coincide, certainly not in the short run but also not necessarily in the long run. There is no direct correlation between the fact that a government is responsible to the population via an election mechanism and its capacity to administer the country efficiently, provide services, etc. In fact, there are democratic countries where governance is poor—see Italy as an example. We like to think that a government responsible to the people has to deliver or be thrown out. This is too optimistic. A weak democratic government—that is one that does not have strong support in the parliament—may be too fragile to be able to make and implement decisions as needed. And the citizens’ right to “throw the rascals out” if they do not perform is often strongly limited by the reality of the election arithmetic, by the fears of the citizens, or by ideological divisions. To go back to the same example, Italians knew that the Christian Democratic Party was both corrupt and ineffectual, but most were not willing to cross the lines and vote for the communists in order to get rid of the poor governance of the Christian democrats.

Also, plenty of studies on the relationship between economic and political reform reach the conclusions that the worst reformers are weak democratic governments.

Of course, by the definition I have given, democratic governments are good on human right and political rights issues—this is simply a tautology

Democratization and armed conflict countries that are democratizing, according to the recent study by Mansfield and Snyder, are more apt to engage in conflict—so it is important to distinguish here between established democracies and democratizing countries. Furthermore, the United States offers a major example of an established democracy with a strong propensity for using force to further its foreign policy goals.

Armed conflict and governance. This is the trickiest one. Certainly conflict is not good for a country. On the other hand, there is plenty of historical evidence—provided by Charles Tilly, that conflict has been at the root of state building because the administrative capacity required to wage war also translates in capacity in other areas. There are some indications, too, that states that managed to pull back from the brink of collapse did so by building their capacity through war. Not an argument in favor of conflict, but the evidence is nevertheless clear.

A) We can only start by achieving working consensus on terms: i) governance is the broad area of values, processes and institutions by which a society (or group) makes decisions for their joint life.  It includes public sector, legal/judicial/security; democracy and human rights aspects.  Democracy is one such element, concerned with the values, processes and institutions by which the entire group/country membership participate in their group’s governance.

B) Conflict and governance are invariably connected, in the first sense that conflict always occurs when adequate governance has not been able or available to manage differences which have grown into violent conflict.  Sometimes armed conflict arises for political reasons, when political actors take purely political disputes to the level of violence.  But armed conflict more often arises from non-political causes, when groups in the state disagree over economic divisions or when sub-group identities become both stronger than the group identity and disputed between the groups.

C)  Armed conflict tends to overwhelm most other objectives or values once it starts.  So armed conflict impacts negatively upon governance and democratization.

D) Good governance, particularly democratic governance which engages the whole population, tends to prevent conflict.  But that is a densely packed statement: it includes the notion that public administration, justice and security are competent by local standards, that they are not corrupt beyond the ability of the country, that both administrators and politicians acknowledge and demonstrate some accountability to the widest population and that the material and identity needs of the population are being satisfied, preferably with regular improvement.  It also suggests, in a manner not necessarily common even in developed democracies, that leaders and politicians play their roles with a positive rather than zero sum vision of national life.  These conditions are more commonly met at great distance from conflict, and tend to be inversely related to it, which suggests that governance and democracy are better as conflict prevention than as conflict resolution techniques.  

E) That said, the promise of better governance and of democracy can be an incentive for those who must live through the difficulties of resolving a conflict.  But unfortunately, the additional resources which may flow in a post-conflict setting and and the openness attached to new democratic systems may both provide more opportunities for the same divisive actions which produced conflict previously.  One is tempted to say that democracy and good governance have a positive role in conflicts where the will has been reached to resolve, and only the mechanisms are missing, but will have a negative role in settings where conflict has only been deferred or masked.

1. Intersection of democratization, governance and armed conflict; institutions, movements and the risks of instability ?
Democratization takes place when state efforts to effect governance practices (nurturing skills in legislating, policing, adjudication, implementing municipal services, etc) value the voice of those for whom public services are being conducted.  The longer such a voice is cowered, repressed or ignored, the greater the chances are that social disapproval of governance structures results in civil tensions, resistance and possibly armed conflict.
The ultimate but not the only element behind democratization is the periodic holding of national elections for the choosing of parliamentarians and state leaders.  
During the Cold war however, the superpowers preferred stability over democracy for their allies and dependent proxies.  Despite wide (non-binding) endorsement for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, in particular for Article 21, paragraph 3, nowhere did the United Nations assist in the organizing of state elections in a newly-independent post-colonial state until 1989, in Namibia, the birth of second generation peacekeeping.  It was only in 1991 that the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 46/137, calling for “periodic and genuine elections”.  Up until this time, the United Nations was forbidden from speaking of elections, favoring the more acceptable and less destabilizing word governance.

While democratic institutions are meant to represent the voice of the governed, it is the maturity and capacity of such institutions which can weaken to the point of public disapproval and conflict.  The holding of elections in a fragile state, especially a post-conflict state, is a seriously divisive exercise.  Elections must be accompanied by simultaneous support to other elements of democratization, being civil society, media, political parties, minority groups, and other pillars of governance, being judicial reform, parliamentary capacity, police training, electoral commission and civil service transparency.  
In the 1930s, Mahatma Gandhi’s salt strike and salt march proved that non-violent civil disobedience can effect democratic change upon unjust governance practices, as conducted by British officials in India where a severe salt tax imposed a heavy burden upon the citizenry.  Gandhi’s movement ultimately lead to India’s independence because the voice of the governed had been ignored by the British.  But it was the selfishness of a few elected political elites (in Delhi and London) that allowed the following partition of India to materialize so violently.  (See Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition, 2007

Democratization is often accompanied by the opening up of space including markets, which may introduce uneven competition and inequalities, causing serious destabilization. In countries with serious ethnic, religious, political/ideological, class, or other cleavages, such competition has the potential to become violent. This is usually the case where conflict has previously occurred and levels of trust amongst the different groups are low.

There is a definite relationship between democratization, governance and armed conflict. The process of democratization is often conflictual in that it enables the freeing up of previously blocked avenues of expression and political participation. However, states undergoing democratization or democratic transitions are often unable to meet the demands of the various groups seeking a stake in a new democratic dispensation and often react with force resulting in violent confrontation.  Democratic institutions or movements during transitions play an important role in mobilizing populations for democratic change. However, the change must be carefully managed so as to prevent knee jerk reaction from the state which is bound to react with force, thereby reversing what might be a positive transition towards democracy. The most important element in managing transitions towards democratic governance is to ensure that the capacity of the state to facilitate the change process is strengthened so that there is no resort to authoritarian tactics to stem the democratization effort. In addition, appropriate incentives to maintain a peaceful transition must be made available to both sides On the side of the democratic movements, it is crucial to ensure that their demands are tampered with an understanding of what the transitioning state can realistically deliver.

At first glance, it would seem that with the advent of the present wave democratization sweeping away through parts of Africa, armed conflicts have declined by half in some instances.  This is particularly relevant in the context of intrastate wars.  This has prompted scholars and leading academics to argue that increased democratization could help bring about a reduction of hostilities among state actors as they are less likely to engage in armed conflict to resolve grievances and disputes.  This is to build on an earlier argument that democracies rarely go into battle among one another and that a large number of inclusive democracies, particularly in the West, are found to experience little political violence as the rule of the law and political discourse to resolve differences among factions and groups, often take their course.

However, it would seem that `anocracies’-states that are deemed partially autocratic and partly democratic are often found to be the most vulnerable group of nations to armed conflicts.  With newly-found freedom and democratic aspirations in Latin America, Asia and the Eastern Europe during much of the 1970s and 1980s, many of these states were quick to jump on the back wagon of political change and transformation towards greater democracy, often without the necessary depth of constitutional reforms, institutional processed and procedures, to firm strengthen this process.  Consequently, a number of these states were succumbed to political forces with considerable influence and power to derail this transformation, while destabilizing the political nature of politics and security.

Whereas autocratic states are generally thought to be somewhat more stable due to the centralization of power and authority within the helms of government and the ruling political elite, anocracies are handicapped by the absence of fully fledged democratic institutions, increasingly weakened by the eroding government control of the state apparatus.

“Western-style” or any other form of democracy is not directly transferable, at least in the sense of taking an existing “blueprint” of institutional arrangements, procedures, and historically established practices and applying it elsewhere. Recent experiences in Iraq, but also Afghanistan and previously the Balkans, have clearly borne this out: the result is a political system that is democratic in name but lacks legitimacy and is ill adapted to local circumstances. Comparisons with post-World War II scenarios such as Germany are likewise misplaced: here, there was a stock of historical experience (including crucial failures) that could be built upon, which arguably was much more important for the ultimate success of post-war democracy than any advice given by the U.S. and its allies.

Before looking for alternatives it is important to recognize that “Western-style” democracy itself contains a great variety of democratic forms: presidential versus parliamentary systems, consociational democracy versus majority-based systems, varying degrees of devolution to local and regional authorities and therefore diffusion of power and resources, different forms of federalism, and there is more.

That said, one could look to enrich this panorama by combining modern democratic institutions with traditional forms of authority (such as councils of elders), possibly at the level of local government or in the context of conflict resolution, transitional justice, or reconciliation activities. Too little is known about these experiences and they need to be studied further. Potentially, traditional forms of authority can conflict with a modern understanding of democratic rights, particularly gender rights.

While democracy can only be successful if it is grounded in local traditions and practices, endorsed by local actors, and sensitive to existing opportunities and constraints, there is a set of basic democratic principles and procedural guarantees that have universal value. Core individual and political rights, due process before the law, regular alternation in power of competing elites (or at least the possibility thereof) are among them. Juxtaposing “formal” and “real” democracy or insisting on the superiority of “popular” over “representative” democracy is generally not helpful. But at the same time there are aspects of direct democracy that can be usefully combined with representative democracy.

There are non-western countries with democratic systems, e.g. India, Japan, Korea. The question is more under what conditions is democracy transferable?
Existence of countervailing political forces
Cross-cutting conflict in the society that makes it possible for people to change their allegiance from one election to another. That is why sectarian divisions have a devastating impact on democracy. If people vote their identity, they do not change their voting patter and majorities and minorities become permanent

Alternate models of democracy? Not really. There are variants of democratic systems—parliamentary or presidential, constitutional monarchies, etc; there are different types of election system. But all attempts to devise alternate democratic models—African democracy, Arab democracy, Islamist democracy—have resulted in authoritarian systems

A. Both of these questions stem from the dangerous tendency to speak in an oversimplified way about democracy.  First, democracy is a universal, not a western, approach to governance, with considerable evidence of its achievability in all regions of the world, and not just in the West.  Second, although different countries have evolved different institutional forms for implementing their democracies, these are relatively superficial in terms of the core principles of valuing all citizens equally, of following agreed rules and approaches transparently and consistently and of providing a meaningful opportunity through voting for participation by all.  There is infinite room in the democratization debate for making these superficial adjustments to institutions to make them more adaptable or palatable to local circumstance.  But there is very little room to challenge the core principles of democracy.  Unfortunately, those who speak of ‘alternative models’ tend to be challenging the core principles, with, for example, non-voting means of representing the citizenry.  These should be rejected.

B. The more important, and much harder, question, is can democracy be transferred, on what timetable.  The comments under 3., following, speak to this challenge

 “western-style” democracy ?
No.  If it is to be sustainable and widely accepted, each state must walk its own path toward defining the characteristics of its democracy.
In 1960, the people of newly-independent Congo participated in elections before African Americans gained the right by the National Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Athens, the birthplace of the world’s first democratic government in the 5 th century BCE, became a dictatorship and a proxy of western powers during the Cold war.  Swiss women only gained the right to vote in federal elections in 1971.  Under the Shah of Iran, women gained the right to vote during the White Revolution of 1963.  After Ho Chi Minh returned to his native Viet Nam, having informally studied politics in the streets of Paris, New York and London in the 1920s, he sought for his fellow citizens the same democratic rights denied him by his French colonizers.  In 1917, Canadian men in uniform on the battle fields of Europe enjoyed more electoral rights than did women, deemed non-persons in Canada.  Only under Islamic leaders have the Iranian people had occasion to vote regularly for both parliamentary and presidential candidates although these are deemed “accessories” (see Shirin Ebadi, Iran Awakening, 2006) of the real power firmly manipulated by religious leaders of the Guardian Council and its master, the Supreme leader Ayatollah Khameini.  

It should be recalled that western style democracy evolved over a period of time and in response to a particular political, social and cultural context. Some general elements of western style democracy have achieved universal acceptance and international ratification and it is important to separate those elements from the specific types of western democracy when advocating for democratization. Each country should be allowed to implement its own system of democracy/governance which respects the key international principles/standards but still takes into careful account its historical, social, economic and political factors.  

Consequently, a number of these states have witnessed repeated and escalating political violence and outbreaks of armed conflict.  This has led many policy makers to question as to whether it was in the best interest of the West to further liberal democracy elsewhere and to understand the implication this might have for international peace and stability.  Over the years, there have been a number of studies that point out that democratizing sates are more likely to undergo civil unrest and turmoil than either mature or autocratic states.  This would allow for a greater likelihood of civil wars to take place.  This can best be explained by the continued lack of legitimacy and the continued of the weakness of the state entity.  

Western powers and institutions all too often fail to understand that promoting and in some instances, exporting western-style democracy to the rest of the world is a process by itself and not an endpoint.  It is a process whereby democratizing states experience and undergo political liberalization at different levels of states instructions and government, leading to continual democratic consolidation needed to overcome the structural weaknesses of government in dealing with pluralities and different interests of competing stakeholders.
Indeed, democratization and its development in the developing world hedged on its sustainability in the face of diverging interests and stakeholders, is a difficult process and should be strengthened and supported for a good number of years by Western institutions to support its sustainability.  The issue at hand for Western powers today is not really how to promote democracy but rather how to consolidate and strengthen existing transition democratic states to allow them to build strong durable state institutions needed to lessen the likelihood for expected shocks and periods of instability, commonly associated with the process of democratization.

This is not to say that “western style democracy” should not be replicated elsewhere or it is not to benefit of many countries undergoing some kind of political instability as a result.  Rather, liberal democracy should be looked as long and painful processes that should be orchestrated and whole-heartedly driven and supported by domestic actors, including civil society, private sector, business, political parties, academia and government.  It has to be a legitimate process driven by locals in those countries if it was to be seen legitimate by the wider population.  Such a support for democratization from within those democratic-inspiring nations would help ensure its sustainability over the long haul.  It cannot be dictated by Western actors, whether government or non-state institutions as it will be seen as an attempt to further the interests of those powers and organizations in the eyes of the international community.

Not very much, aside from the crucial insight that democratic change is a long-term and non-linear process. Setbacks and reversals are very much a part of the process and transitions from democracy back to some form of authoritarian rule – or to new, non-democratic forms of populism, for example – cannot be ruled out.

There is no one “methodology” strictly speaking of how democratic change can be achieved, only a number of concrete experiences in fairly different historical and geographic settings (for example, the different “waves” of democratic transitions in southern and eastern Europe, Latin America, etc.). It is helpful to compare these experiences and extract some common lessons but democratization always remains context-specific.

Regarding the potential role of external actors there is growing skepticism, due in part to fresh memories of failed or at least very problematic interventions (mentioned above). It is clear that democracy cannot be “exported” and that even successful experiences of democratization need to be “edited” and adapted in order to be useful elsewhere. That said, external actors could play useful roles in backing up local democratic actors, helping to create institutional environments conducive to democratic change, or more generally by supporting democratic pluralism and openness in its various forms.

Methodology: anything from violent revolution to pacted transitions or slow processes

Time frame—again from centuries to weeks (Czechoslovakia) but even this answer does not make much sense because nobody knows when one should start counting or when the process is completed, if ever

VIRTUALLY NOTHING!  The well-intentioned desire to help other countries make their governing systems more democratic is, for the most part, less than two decades old and the effort to date has largely been focused on action rather than theory.  Given the historical opportunities which the fall of the Berlin Wall presented, this is neither surprising nor inappropriate.  But as practice reaches out into more and more country situations, and results become more complex to achieve and sustain, there is a great deal to be argued in favour of giving both theory and practice their appropriate priority.

For timetables, one might suggest a continuum of time spans, ranging from the seven hundred plus years it took the United Kingdom to move from the Magna Carta to universal suffrage to the year or two which it took for several of the ‘colour’ revolutions to effect changes of regime in Czechoslovakia, Ukraine and Georgia.  This enormous variability simply demonstrates that we do not yet understand the dynamic/methodology of democratization sufficiently to put meaningful timetables on it.

What do we understand?  First, we know the basic institutions by which democracy operates in those countries with good democratic records - the electoral bodies, legislatures, parties and media and so forth.  Second, we are aware of broader legal, economic and social systems which seem to play an important part in the success of democratic institutions.  But each of these first and second order aspects is complex and has its own dynamic.  We have tended to deal with only one or another of the institutional aspects, rarely with the democratic system as a whole and even more rarely with democracy in its economic and social context.

Instead, we need to find the resources to put good academic and research minds to work on democratization, to establish workable if imperfect categorizations and metrics for the various institutions and contexts of democracy.  We then need to begin applying these in a consistent fashion to a variety of historical democratization processes, both western and southern, recent and more distant.  A good comparative understanding, for example, of how Western Europe democratized would be invaluable, but so too would be more rigorous understandings of how democratization is proceeding in the wide range of country settings in African, Asia, Europe and Latin and North America in which it is occurring.

Perhaps the most important thing which we can do to increase our understanding of democratization is to recognize the need for a research agenda distinct from our action and our agendas.  We cannot stop acting while we research.  But our perilous grasp on practice should make us want to increase our understanding.  Our research should be action research, in the sense of avoiding sterile academicism and relating to the real world agenda.  But it must step back from action, which rarely gives time for useful reflection.

Timetables of democratic change ?
Currently, programs for the fostering of democratic change, whether originally indigenous or foreign or a combination, have been highjacked and negatively tainted by a post-9/11 White House policy favouring regime change, as explained in Foreign Affairs by Thomas Carothers in March/April 2006 (see link )
One has but to interview Canadian-Iranian Ramin Jahanbegloo of the University of Toronto to learn how he was affected by the 2007 announcement of US $75 million in State Department funds for the promotion of democratic programs in Iran.  He was jailed in Tehran’s Evin prison and held in confinement for 4 months until released.  Other American-Iranian academics were detained by Iran during visits in 2007.

Regarding timeframes, no society should have elections quickly foisted upon them.  (Neither should a society be made to await “ideal” conditions for polling to take place.)  Donors and political leaders facing their own electoral accountability often prefer quick-fix short-term commitments that will not tie up treasure, troops and party credibility.
Following the end of the Cold war, the United Nations was called upon by the former superpowers to quickly remedy the problems of governance in Angola, assuming a simple election could solve decades of power struggle.  When Jonas Savimbi’s political party failed to win the 1992 elections, he returned to fighting his newly-elected foe.  The international community had failed to foster other vital governance components for the nurturing of democratic change.  These lessons were learned to the benefit of Cambodia’s UN-sponsored elections in 1993 and to those of Mozambique in 1994, but then forgotten again before the Dayton-rushed elections of Bosnia in 1996, mandate a mere 9 months after the signed Paris peace deal.  Extremists and ethnic militants won elected offices.  Municipal elections were postponed for another 12 months.  

The re-election campaigns of two US Presidents have taken priority over the first genuine elections of post-conflict states – Bosnia and Iraq.  In late 1995, President Clinton promoted a short military and electoral calendar for healing a new democratic Bosnia. Nine years later, President Bush focused on his own re-election in November 2004 while maintaining that elections in Iraq could take place within a civil war scenario two months after he sent the marines into Fallujah.  Sunni Arab parties would boycotted the January 2005 elections of Iraq.  President Bush had engineered the democratisation timetable of Iraq in such a way that a US electorate could not hold him accountable for a failed election in Iraq.  US troops are much too expensive to be seen to be managing nation-building tasks like securing foreign elections, at least before a US election.  The rush to democratization in post-conflict states has seen mixed results.

There cannot be one- size- fits- all methodology or time frame. It will depend    on historical, social, political and economic factors. In addition, sudden shocks can precipitate democratic change as happened with the Asian Economic crisis and Indonesia’s democratization. Clearly there can be no set timeframes or methodologies

Democratization often requires different mechanisms in place to assist state undergo substantial democratic change.  The route often found to be more practical from an operational perspective is played out in different stages, starting with peace building confident measures, disarmament and demobilization in areas of post-conflict scenarios.  This is often followed by strengthening of the rule of law and strengthening the security apparatus of government to ensure peaceful elections take place in the near future.  Governments of national unity are increasingly found to be better responsive in addressing the grievances of warring parties.  This is imperative in the sense that political discourse within such a government needs to take in consideration all outstanding issues while tackling the root of the instability in the first place.  There should be enough resources from donor communities and government for a truth and reconciliation courts to help heal injustices of the past and present governments with alternative modalities of tackling future political grievances to avoid a resumption of conflict.  A reform of the justice system is often imperative toward a return of hostilities and periods of instability.

It is often more pragmatic if such a process is followed by a leadership on the part of the government and political will to strengthen the build-up of credible political parties while allowing sufficient breathing space for opposition groups to mature.  This has often worked in parallel to a strengthening parliamentary strengthening program, judicial reform work, and small-scale efforts to improve civil-military relations as well as reformation of the police, a systematic and adequate training and resources for a credible and independent media.  These steps while important in the immediate term following the cessation of hostilities in post-conflict settings as well as in periods of civil unrest in democratic-inspiring states, should be build with the aim of restoring the rule and law, needed to hold free and fair elections, build up electoral commission needed to oversee those elections.  

However, it is dangerous to assume this experimental and working arrangement in building up a process geared towards strengthening democratic institutions in anocracies as a zero-sum exercise.  Rather, elections ought to be viewed as a one important step out of many to take place, needed to cement democratic institutions in these states.  It is an organic process that should reflect the will of the people and their interests in furthering the call of liberal democracy.   Just as the majority of Western states underwent painful centuries of experimentation of different aspects of democratic institutions to become fully-fledged democracies today, the rest of the world would need the ample space and time to achieve the same results.

One major contribution on the part of Canadian civil society could be to work with and support local partners themselves involved in peace or democratization efforts. Monitoring of local developments, campaigning and advocacy on behalf of these partners is important, but the collaboration shouldn’t stop there. Canadian civil society actors could help with coalition building, especially at regional and international levels. They could help in mobilizing resources. There is also a role for technical assistance, if is targeted properly and doesn’t undermine the building of local capacities.

A potential obstacle is the tendency on the part of some international NGOs to “import” solutions and approaches from elsewhere without sufficient knowledge of local requirements (beware of toolkits!).

Again, extremely difficult to generalize because it all depends on the particular phase of the process, either in democratization or peace-building.

In a hostile environment, that is before an overall peace agreement has been reached or a new government installed, local NGOs can sometimes be very effective at the local level, for example helping negotiating local truces and agreements even while the fighting continues nationally.

International NGOs have occasionally been successful in mediation efforts and track 2 diplomatic efforts (Mozambique, the Oslo agreement) but this is fairly rare.

Both international and local NGOs are more likely to have an impact in the process of consolidation of either peace or democracy

A. The tendency in official aid circles is to envision development as: i) decided and planned by recipient governments; ii) funded by multilateral and bilateral agencies under agreement with recipients governments; and iii) implemented by local contract with either local or international capacities.  Arguably, this marginalizes the contribution of both Canadian and local civil society groups.  Overcoming this vision, broadly and through the Ghana conference later this year, will demand that civil society groups create a new image of their capabilities and role.  On one hand, they need to demonstrate with results that they are very often a key source of technical knowledge and capability.  On another, international civil society needs to create an image of ‘accompaniment,’ which convinces all that development change necessitates not just knowledge and money but also the will and confidence to attempt and succeed at change.  That accompaniment necessitates sympathetic partners who can inform and encourage but also help to create climates of results and accountability; with no profit motive, civil society is well placed to play such a role.

B. Funding is a primary obstacle, knowledge another.  Encouraging the main actors to make such funding available is a major challenge, one which will be partly met by showing how partnerships in civil society can contribute to both accountability and pluralism in partner countries.  But it is most likely to come when civil society organizations, Canadian or local, learn to demonstrate how they can contribute positively rather than critically to national agendas.  Local civil society, in particular, must learn to play more differentiated roles, developing the ability to be supportive of government as well as critical.

How to contribute ?
Canadian donors can think more long term, like meeting the governance needs of an electoral cycle, building capacity over 4 to 5 years between the first and second polls.
Local civic groups can be trained as they have been by IFES, NDI, Soros Open Societies, to nurture the skills and monitor the behavior of their own government institutions and political parties.  The training of local media in young democracies remains essential.  

With regards to supporting democratization around the world, the first step is for Canadian organizations / civil society to understand that the role of the Canadian government is not to promote a particular type of democracy that negates or ignores the historical, political and economic realities of the relevant countries. Canadian CSO should also understand the setbacks that they are likely to face. This is particularly important given the setbacks that democratization has suffered over the past 10 years due to the conflicts that have been waged by some superpowers in the name of democratization. In addition, the reversal of what was a growing acceptance of democracy can also be attributed to what is perceived as double-standards by western powers with regards to their refusal to accept legitimate outcomes of democratic processes in the Middle East. Canadian CSO’s must appreciate the increasing backlash against western-promoted ideologies and criticisms due to these ambivalent approaches.  With regards to the maintenance of peace, this effort requires the involvement of many actors including the Canadian government operating on its own and also under the auspices of the United Nations.  

It is often noted that injecting resources into the democratization processes in democratic-inspiring nations is often a complex and risky.  To much of the discredit of Western powers, a precondition and instances on elections as a pre-condition to democratization, has often led to more serious obstacles and challenges, rather than an entry point for democratic institutions to take hold.  Canada should be disengaging itself in activities where the central emphasis is on organizing and facilitating elections.  Rather, it could contribute to the processes of democratization in a field, often neglected by donor communities in the past, that of strengthening democratic control over security institutions.  

With the move towards democracy, formal control of security forces should be transferred to civil authorities.  However, more often than not, public accountability often lags behind.  For the most part, the military retains significant state resources.  Canada can assist post-conflict states and democracies in transition states by providing technical expertise in terms of training and capacity building as well as budgetary support designed to strengthen and improve the size, structure and operations of security forces, which should be based on solid legal foundations operating within the realm of political responsibility and accountability to the people.  The aim is essentially to build a strong military that is accountable to government and the populations that safeguards the process of democratization.

For Canada to be involved in strengthening security sectors in these democratic-aspiring states, it needs to determine what is affordable and what is sustainable.  It also needs to take into consideration the need to allocate resources based on priorities within and between different, often competing security agencies.  Lastly, there needs to be an efficient and effective mechanism to oversee its implementation.  However, efforts to create a security force that responds to critical areas of national security and that which follows democratic principles, Canada’s budgetary and technical support can only be successful if there is a genuine political will among government leaders in these countries in ensuring effective and successful processes.

The Democracy Council already brings together the relevant government departments and Canadian crown corporations. Peacebuild and/or CCIC could play a useful role in helping to coordinate the work of Canadian NGOs interested in democratization. The recent SCFAID report mentions a number of other options, including the creation of some new institutions and programs. It would be interesting to discuss some of these options in greater detail.

Government agencies—for example in building a constabulary, building capacity, etc. NGOs are often intermediaries and implementers in these efforts, but often they do not have the capacity and in any case they do not have much money unless it comes through the government

For ideological and financial reasons, relatively few of the Canadian actors which are active in international development make the contribution which they might to democratization and peace maintenance.  By this, I mean the wide variety of groups, both civil society and commercial, who engage in other, non-governance areas.  This is a function of the failure of governance and peace groups to provide better knowledge to these other groups.  To pick an easy example, all NGO’s engaged in development should have as one dimension of their work to strengthen the internal governance and democratization of their local partners.  As a second dimension, they should also help their partners to take on a public role and to participate in the governance, at whatever level, of their country and, as a third, they should help their partners to envision their country in tolerant, pluralist terms.  Effectively, groups must learn to look past their health, welfare, education or other identities to become peace and democracy supporters as well.

Looking at the question from another perspective, only a relatively narrow slice of Canadian expertise in governance and democracy is mobilized and made available to strengthen the processes of democratization and peace maintenance.  When Canadians have been engaged, they have tended to both be well received and to do a good job.  Primarily, the mechanisms which make Canadians aware of the development challenge are too limited in scope to raise interest, provide opportunity and promote engagement.  Where the effort has been made, for example, by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities or the Canadian Bar Association, the response has been fairly good.  But funds, for programming in general, for public awareness and engagement and for research, are limited and the pressures are to spend them on final results, not on building better Canadian engagement.    Political party staff, ie., not just elected politicians, and provincial bureaucrats are just two groups with potential to contribute to democracy and peace.

Canadian actors :
Members of Canada’s new Democracy Council (DC) count Rights and Democracy, IDRC, Elections Canada, National Judicial Institute, the Parliamentary Center and the Forum of Federations.  These six organizations, three of which are direct recipients of core funding from government sources (IDRC, EC and FoF), provide a window on Canada’s governance and democratisation efforts abroad.  The DC focuses on ensuring that Canadian efforts are coordinated, and provide for a community of practice for those in government and non-government seeking to learn from and improve Canada’s commitment to programs.  There is scope for broadening the membership of the DC once a structure, budget and location has been agreed.  The report of the Government of Canada’s standing committee on foreign affairs and international trade (SCFAIT) endorsed the establishment of the DC in its report of 2007.

The Canadian government should be definitely involved in supporting democratization and maintaining international peace and security. In order to successfully do so it should not be perceived as having double standards with regards to the issues highlighted in 4 above.

Canada’s comparative advantage in democracy building has historically originated form a variety of experiences, including managing a dual common law/civil code, running successful elections and referendums, integrating gender equality into policy making, safeguarding minority rights, to name a few.  There are a large number of Canadian NGOs and professionals operating their knowledge and their vast previous experiences in democratic governance work around the world.

Some areas where Canadian actors should be encouraged to apply their technical assistance could include judicial training and legal reform as well as election supervising.  It is to the country’ comparative advantage to use their image as a soft power, highly regarded for its multicultural cosmopolitan identity, collaborative style of working with developing countries, and a track record of managing highly successful democracy building projects to build up on its positive reputation as a partner and ally to democratic-inspiring nations.

Organizations such as Montreal-base Rights and Democracy, CANADEM and other NGOs and civil society should be encouraged to work with government agencies, in particular CIDA and DFID and research institutes to build a coherent blueprint for a national foreign policy geared towards democracy promotion and consolidation.  Such a policy would ideally reflect the country’s shared values in democracy and freedom while promoting its national security interests.

As mentioned before, it is crucial not to replace or sideline local actors, be it local institutions or civil society. External actors should resist the temptation of intervening themselves or by working exclusively through intermediaries with weak local roots, such as local representatives of INGOs headquartered in developed countries. Obviously, it is also problematic when international aid efforts lead to the creation of parallel bureaucracies, even if the effectiveness of these efforts is otherwise compromised. Instead, the focus should lie on the building of local capacities whenever possible.

By working within a framework provided by the fragile state, or at least agreed upon jointly by the fragile state and donor government. NGOs cannot make policy for a country. For example, in the health field NGO insistence that they build and run their clinics outside government control.

No matter how weak the government of the country is, the appropriate agencies need to be in control of the planning process for how outside assistance is going to be used. In the worst cases, it may mean that the local agencies need to be assisted in taking this role. However, in no case should donors dictate what the local agencies must do and in no cases should foreign agencies and NGOs allowed to operate except in the framework of an overall plan the government played a part in developing. This may slow down the process some, but is crucial in the long run. While the recommendation seems obvious, it is not always easy to implement. Foreign donors act on the basis not only of their own preferences, but also sometimes of clear mandates from their parliaments. NGOs are often ideologically opposed to close cooperation with the government. But unless the government is at the center of everything, its legitimacy will be undermined. Another issue that is crucial to not undermining the government is salary levels—if foreign agencies and NGOs pay much higher salaries than the government, a brain drain will take place. Possibly donors should consider salary support or other supplements to keep civil servants in their positions.

In theoretical terms, these are near impossibilities.  In practical terms, all actors must develop useful metrics which allow them to assess local conditions realistically, learn to negotiate agendas which are truly shared and to develop incentives for elites which encourage broad rather than narrow visions.  But they must also learn to not want too much, to not offer more than can be delivered by locals.  To do otherwise is to necessitate building parallel capacities.

The issue of state fragility needs to be carefully analysed. The first and most important issue that has to be understood is that contrary to general belief, state fragility has its cause in both internal and external factors. Literature and policy responses have thus far focused only on the internal causes resulting in a backlash from countries who protest at being labeled as being fragile. Regarding internal causes of state fragility,   States may lose legitimacy usually because of the way power is attained in those states or because of their inability to deliver public goods to their populations or because of weak governance capacities.

Any bilateral, multilateral and NGOs interventions in democracy promotion and consolidation should be aligned within the national framework of national government polices.  It should work towards enhancing such a framework and not compete with it.  Secondly, such interventions need to work within the guidelines already existing in the nations they are supposed to serve.

In addition to asking how can we help, we should also ask: are we doing harm? And how do we correct the problem?

Canadian’s understanding of and involvement in development.

It is useful to also consider what positive role democratic governance may play in enhancing peace in a country and what efforts can be made to ensure that democratic transitions are supported in such a way that they produce peaceful outcomes. This includes careful consideration of the timing and sequencing of key democratic processes such as elections which while in themselves are important in democratization, they may exacerbate conflict due to the accompanying high- stakes competitions for power.

In addition, the potential negative impact of some governance activities on conflict must be explored more carefully. Attention should also be paid to the fact that democratic institutions do per se prevent violence. In certain cases they may actually promote conflict if they permit a majority to dominate a minority. Thus the quality and inclusiveness of democratic systems must be analysed and matched with particular political, ethnic, and historical realities of countries.