My impression is that judicial and legislative reforms, as part of democratization and rule of law development, at this stage, do not appear to challenge historic exclusions based on gender and age. Rwanda stands out as an exception where post-genocide Rwanda has a significant number of women in political office at various levels of government, and these numbers are a substantial increase from pre-genocide Rwanda. Further, there is some representation of women in the Rwandan judiciary, and this too seems to be a promising development. Some of the gains made in the representation of Rwandan women in political life can be attributed to a pro-active stance by the post-genocide Rwanda government. 
The case of post-genocide Rwanda may provide some insights into how government policy can facilitate the inclusion of women into democratization and governance reform. But, other post-conflict examples, such as Afghanistan, are a testimony to how difficult it can be to sustain commitments, after the initial burst of ‘enthusiasm’, to the inclusion of women in political and democratic processes. And, the inclusion of youth in post-conflict state re-building is often non-existent. This can be particularly problematic in situations, such as in Rwanda but in other areas as well, where households are headed by young people, often young women. Their role in sustaining household economies and social stability is often over-looked and certainly unrewarded in post-conflict distribution of resources.

1.How and at what points do gendered and age-based identities intersect with processes of democratization, governance and armed conflict? 

a.How and at what points do gendered and age-based identities intersect with processes of democratization – for example judicial and legislative reform?
The fundamental tie between identity, democratization, and armed conflict is the presence or absence of human rights, and how situations of conflict impact the realization of rights. A sign that democratization processes are coming to fruition would be when legal reforms start integrating international norms of children’s rights and women’s rights into domestic law. For example, when family laws include protections for minors, or there is differentiated criminal law for juveniles (protections, less severe sentences, rehabilitation requirements). The cornerstone piece of international law on children’s rights is the Convention on the Rights of the Child- when this is ratified by the state, that’s a sign of democratization in the legal system. Similarly, when the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination of Women are ratified at the state level, and actually enforced, this is democratization with regards to women’s rights. It wouldn’t be “democratization” without the equal application of rights and freedoms, including special rights and freedoms, without these elements to protect and enforce women’s and children’s rights. Protection and enforcement would also require that an effective court system be in place: e.g., are family courts accessible to all citizens?

b.How and at what points do gendered and age-based identities intersect with processes of security sector reform?
To the measure that international legal standards for women’s and children’s rights are actually enforced by the security sector: e.g., are rights on paper also in practice? The security sector is the implementation point of the law. Representation is also an issue: is there a gender balance in the police force, for instance, representative of the overall population? A sign of democratization measure within the security sector would also be the capacity of security sector institutions to protect the rights of special groups, like children. For instance, do the police have protocols in place when arresting juveniles? Are there special departments to prosecute the exploitation of children in the sex trade? Are police trained in gender sensitivity? Are there protocols in place to respond to cases of sexual violence?

c.How and at what points do gendered and age-based identities intersect with democratization and reconceptualizations of citizen-state relations?
They intersect perhaps most pointedly in participation and inclusion in democratic processes. In forums where citizens exercise their rights in a democratic state, are women present? To what degree? What kind of women (poor, rich, middle class? White? Religious minorities?)? Are young people present? Forums of participation includes voting but goes well beyond participation in elections; for instance, the right to freedom of assembly: are women included as members and leaders in civil society, in independent institutions which interact with the state, or lobby the state? Are women present in the media: reporting and reported on? Do women and youth have access to information? The right to freedom of speech? Free mobility? What kind of spaces exist for women and youth to interact and affect the state? Are these spaces conducive to meaningful participation (as opposed to tokenism)?

d.How and at what points do gendered and age-based identities intersect with processes of democratization – for example judicial and legislative reform?
Both these types of identities tend to intersect with democratization at local, national, & international levels.  At local levels, civic groups such as village committees, school management committees, women’s groups, and traditional age-based associations have all contributed to an incremental broadening of forums of public discourse and decision-making at local levels.  In a very real sense, “democracy from below” occurs as a consequence of increasing awareness of the contributions as well as difficulties confronting women and youth in local community settings, and the subsequent engagement of women and youth in discussions and decision-making.  At national levels, women’s associations are now commonly having an impact on structures and systems of national governance.  An example is the emphasis that is being put on the importance of girls’ schooling and the necessity of expanding women’s occupational opportunities and income earning potential.  Similarly, the reality of child and youth workers has tended to slowly heighten awareness of the rights of child and youth laborers.  In West Africa, for example, the Movement of Working Children and Youth has not only raised awareness of working children’s rights, but has lobbied effectively for policies designed to protect child workers from exploitative working situations and from police harassment.  At an international level, of course, myriad international organizations promoting the rights of women and children have brought pressure to bear on governments regarding the need for more appropriate judicial and policy responsiveness to issues confronting those whose lives are framed by gender and age-related related realities.  Likewise, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) are clearly designed to cajole governments into promulgating legislation and policies designed to protect women and young people.

e.How and at what points do gendered and age-based identities intersect with processes of security sector reform?
s noted above, advocacy on behalf of the rights of children, youth, and women has been directed in part at ensuring that legislation and law enforcement are implemented in order to protect rather than to mistreat these groups.  Unfortunately, however, headway on the security front has been slow.  While laws and policies designed to reduce the sexual exploitation and abuse of women and children are increasingly being promulgated, too rarely are these being implemented or effectively enforced.  Likewise, although child rights legislation has been enacted in many countries, implementation of measures to ensure the realization of children’s rights has been either slow or, in too many cases, almost non-existent.  On a somewhat different plane, precisely because many young people, particularly males, are marginalized and have been denied opportunities for education and dignified remunerative work, the phenomena of youth crime, organized youth violence, and child soldiery have become major security concerns in numerous countries.  Indeed, the whole issue of child poverty and inadequate enforcement of child rights has generated concerns about the connection between security and youth.  This has led to an unfortunate focus on the link between aged-based identities (i.e., youth) and declining security.  Too often the official response is one of crime control and mana dura (“get tough”) policies that underlie police and militaristic interventions that aim to forcibly curb youth crime and violence and incarcerate youth.  Far too little attention is focussed on the necessity of connecting age-based identities with genuine social and security sector reform.  Although space does not allow me to elaborate, suffice it to say that a focus on strengthening neighbourhood social capital, including the introduction and/or enhancement of community policing, should be the focus of greater policy initiatives and resource allocations as a way to steer young people away from crime and violence towards more peaceful, constructive, and productive activity.

f.How and at what points do gendered and age-based identities intersect with democratization and reconceptualizations of citizen-state relations?
It is at this intersection of democratization and citizen-state relations where gendered and age-based identities have had the most notable impact – again at local, national, & international levels.  It is at local “grassroots” levels where women and youth in many parts of the world are helping to generate a gradual modification of predominant patriarchal and elder-dominated power structures.  With women’s associations now generally legitimate and commonplace, and with growing numbers of educated and articulate youth who are able to voice their aspirations as well as their grievances, it has become increasingly difficult to undertake local decisions and actions without considering gendered and aged-based perspectives.  That being said, because democratization often entails public dissension and conflicting perspectives, and because givernments in most countries have been captured by powerful elite interests, at national levels the perspectives of women and youth are often ignored or suppressed by dominant authorities.  This is dangerous, particularly when the aspirations and demands of youth are discounted and youth themselves are made to see themselves as irrelevant or expendable.  In such circumstances, where incipient democratization is crushed by forces that have a vested interested in an unjust and corrupt status quo, many young people (especially disenchanted males) steer their energy and abilities towards reckless destruction of those forces they perceive as denying them opportunities to participate.  Tragically and ironically, such destructive tendencies are too often directed at those who are essentially innocent (e.g., members of other ethnic groups, and especially women whose reproductivity is essential for the future of the “others”).  The genocide in Rwanda, the use of rape as a war tactic, and the current disturbing instances of youth violence and incipient ethnic cleansing in Kenya, are instances of outrageous behaviours unleashed when democratic processes have been squelched by an entrenched and corrupted “anti-democratic” elite who have long held sway over the organs of the nation state.  Internationally, of course, the whole phenomenon of social movements advocating on behalf of the rights of women and children has contributed to a process of international democratization.  With myriad civic groups becoming increasingly inter-connected (thanks in large part to the ICT revolution), an alternative paradigm of citizen-state relations is emerging whereby those who govern must increasingly heed and respond to the demands of the governed (rather than the other way round).

Great care needs to be taken in postulating intersections between ‘identity’ and conflict. We are in a period where, for whatever reason, Western audiences tend to view conflicts through an ethnic lens. This lens can be often inappropriate and inaccurate and can lead to misrecognition of conflicts, their causes, and the resulting solutions. This is not to say that race and ethnicity do not play a role in many conflicts, but the tendency to see conflicts as engaging ethnic or other identities may lead to an erasure of the extent to which violence combined sustained political effort is needed to resurrect and mobilize ethnic identities. For example, in Rwanda, often seen as the quintessential ‘ethnic conflict’, research suggests that in several regions, inter-ethnic violence did not take place for several weeks and sometimes longer after the start of the genocide, and even then required a concerted intervention by the military and/or the Interahamwe before residents in a particular communes engaged in violence along ethnic lines.
That said, within the African continent, there appears to be a series of conflicts that we might, loosely and with many definitional misgivings, refer to as ‘internal’ conflicts in that they take part largely between government forces, insurgents and militias, and in which civilians are routinely targeted for killings and abuse. Conflicts of this type would include: Darfur, southern Sudan, the DRC, Sierra Leone (until recently), northern Uganda, to name a few. While these are often qualified as ‘internal’ conflicts, they should more accurately be seen as conflicts with a regional dimension, where the actions of neighbouring states/interests are often directly implicated both in the conditions of instability that lead to conflict, and to the unfolding of the conflict itself. For example, it would be a mistake to see the atrocities in Darfur in isolation from historic relations between the Khartoum government, Darfur, Chad and Libya. Equally, the Rwandan genocide was much influenced by political violence in Burundi, and government actions in Uganda. And so on.

All conflicts have sharp gendered and age-related impacts, though in the Anglo-American imagery both gender and age are often overlooked in the formal reckoning of the impact of wars. The types of conflicts I outline above also have gender and age consequences. First, the targeting of civilians is often highlighted by many as a constituent element of the ‘new wars’. I agree that the targeting of civilians stands out as a defining feature, but I would suggest that all wars target civilians, despite pretensions otherwise. We are, nonetheless, in a period where the targeting of civilians is highly focused, brutal and alarming. And, the civilian populations most directly affected by this destruction and brutality are women, young girls and young boys.
   
Second, sexual violence, principally but not exclusively against women and young girls, has been notably common in several of the conflicts listed above. Again, I caution against a characterization of sexual violence, even large-scale sexual violence in wartime as ‘new’. Nonetheless, the patterns of particularly brutal and highly targeted sexual violence against civilian populations are worrying and should be the topic of sustained research and policy response. While there is a tendency to see large-scale sexual violence as seemingly epidemic, it is important to track how the patterns and methods of sexual violence vary. Not all conflicts are characterized by large-scale sexual violence (Wood 2006), and not all forms of sexual violence are the same. As a preliminary distinction, sexual violence can be motivated by and directed at a number of things from sexual opportunism to marriage and access to resources, and from the settling of old scores to community destruction. Modalities of sexual violence are both connected to pre-conflict forms of inequality and oppression, and often continue into so –called ‘peace’ time. 
   
Sexual violence predominantly, but not exclusively, affects women and girls, but some of the different modalities of sexual violence will be differentiated according to age. For example, ‘forced marriage’, sometimes referred to as the taking of ‘bush wives’, tends to be targeted at younger women and often young girls. This phenomenon of forced marriage requires further research and the term ‘bush wives’ is probably inaccurate and misleading, suggesting this is a peculiarly ‘African’ phenomena. Forced marriage can also be found in inter-state conflicts in other parts of the globe, such as the conflicts that took place at the partitioning of India and Pakistan. The implications of forced marriage are not, I think, fully understood and are complicated by a tendency to see actors as either civilians, and hence presumed not to be participant in war, or participants/combatants. Forced marriage, much like aspects of child soldiering, can blur the lines between civilian/victim and participant/combatant, and this has consequences for, among other things, post-conflict access to resources and justice. Finally, forced marriage highlights the importance of specifying young girls as a category distinct from women and young boys (Park 2006) to appreciate how gender and age intersect to position young girls at particular sites of disadvantage. 
   
The third worrying trend in some of the conflicts discussed above is the use of child soldiers. Again, this phenomenon is by no means limited to the African continent or the conflicts I list above. Child soldiering tends to be defined by age and gender and tends to be focused on young boys. Having said that, young girls are sometimes also child soldiers and once again, the phenomena of ‘forced marriage’ plays a role that might not be fully understood at this stage. Some girls, for example, might occupy positions that under international law look like sexual slavery, through forced marriage, but at the same time, those same girls may also participate in conflicts as ‘combatants’. Both international law and post-conflict reconciliation institutions have a difficult time responding to the difficulties posed for young girls and boys who might be both victims and participants with loyalties to their ‘adopted’ communities.
   
(A final note, which I raise only for information and almost as a footnote given that it does not appear to fit within the remit of this discussion, is that age and gender distinctions are also found in international humanitarian law in the category ‘elderly men’, for whom both age and gender come together in marking them as a particular class of civilian/non-combatant.)

Women, young girls and boys victimized through conflict need to be fully accepted into society post-conflict, and to have full access to the resources and means to establish themselves as valued participant members in that society. Post-conflict reconciliation measures have, by and large, consistently excluded women and young girls from full participation and, more egregiously, access to resources. While Rwanda has, once again, fared slightly better than others in some of these respects, the treatment of young girls in Sierra Leone is consistently egregious and has continued to exclude and marginalize them in access to any sort of post-conflict reconciliation. Post-conflict redress including post-conflict justice has failed women and young girls. The occasional prosecution of sexual violence crimes by an international court is not a ‘success’ in addressing the entrenched inequalities faced by women, young girls and boys.

2.Which elements of the interconnections between identity, democratization, governance and armed conflict are new (if any)?
Depends what you mean by new: how new is new? Also, each context will have its own evolution of the relationships between identity, democratization and conflict.

a.What conflicts in particular do you see as representative of these new interconnections? 
Afghanistan is a context where these interconnections are certainly not new, but are rapidly changing with each new regime that comes into power. The monarchy in the 1930s, and then again in the 1960s, interpreted democratization as meaning certain new rights for women: to work outside the women, to work in the civil service, to be elected to parliament, to sit on the judiciary, to not be obligated to wear the veil, to attend university, etc. During the Soviet occupation era, there was emphasis on women’s emancipation and women’s higher education. During the civil war and mujahideen government period of the early 1990s, women’s rights were repressed and children’s rights not existence. During the Taliban era, women’s rights were so repressed that this period is often referred to as ‘gender apartheid’ or ‘gendercide’, an extreme example of misogynous rule against women. Under the current regime, women’s rights face a delicate path forward constantly facing tensions between the Afghan Government, the mujahideen, warlords and local power holders, parliament, the international community, civil society, and the clergy, with drastic differences between urban and rural areas, and between different ethnic groups. In all cases, the presence of armed conflict and the absence of presence of democratic institutions and processes determined what rights women and children had or did not have.

b.How do these new interconnections affect men and women, and girls and boys different (in the conflicts that you have named)?
Women often have different sets of rights available to them to begin with, with many states (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Somalia) having discrimination officially enshrined through discriminatory laws in place. Conflict can further exacerbate the denial of these rights, and in some cases conflict may be used to justify the denial of rights to one group, such as women (as the Taliban did when they shut down girls’ education, claiming they would attend to that when the country was more “secure”). In other cases, the rights women do have on paper are barred from them when there is a conflict. Security plays a huge role in this. In Afghanistan, insecurity restricts or denies women’s freedom of movement, freedom of association and freedom of expression. It limits their participation in the economic, social, cultural and political life of their country, therefore denying rights they do have according to the Afghan Constitution, civil and criminal law, and international human rights law to which the Afghan state is a party.

c.What are the most compelling needs of women, girls and boys in the context of these new interconnections?
Making space for women in public institutions (parliament, civil service) and in cultural institutions (religious spaces, celebrations, literature, music, film, media)
Making public space accessible to women: parks, libraries, recreation, etc
Ensuring that transitional justice mechanisms acknowledge the different kinds of atrocities and human rights violations faced by men, women, boys and girls (e.g. sexual violence, forced prostitution)

d.When considering these new interconnections, what have been the greatest failures in responding to the needs of women, girls and boys?
To address women’s rights within cultures. Women are frequently used in cultural and religious communities as the barometer measuring the “purity” of a society. In Afghanistan, families where all the women dress modestly, veil and practice purdah (the segregation of men and women), and where women have no contact with unrelated men, will represent a “good” Muslim family in some ethnic groups. But the interpretation of religious texts and rules to mean that these things represent what it means to be Muslim is a political decision that gives one group power over another. Acknowledging this is the starting point by which women can gain agency within their religious or cultural community, as opposed to only outside of it.
To focus exclusively on humanitarian needs and to neglect social, economic and political development needs that can change power imbalances and institutionalized injustices in place against women and children.

a.What conflicts in particular do you see as representative of these new interconnections? 
It is not surprising that, in light of these interconnections, most of the world’s armed conflicts are now internecine rather than between states.  In many countries in the current post-Cold War era, systems of governance are weak, states are fragile or have collapsed, and the dynamic for democratization has been thwarted because of entrenched structures that resist accommodating those who have traditionally been excluded from power.  In such circumstances, when marginalized people are denied access to their fundamental aspirations, the force of identity can become pathological and serve as the stimulus for conflict and atrocities directed at those whose identities are seen to be different.  The notion of the threatening “other” can take on dangerous connotations.  Where democracy and good governance are denied, the politics of identity tend to be unleashed in wholly destructive ways.  Consequently, given the significance of the politics of identity in the current era, it is vital that such politics be channelled into forms of genuine and sustainable democratic practices within established institutions of good governance. 

b.How do these new interconnections affect men and women, and girls and boys different (in the conflicts that you have named)?
These interconnections affect males & females (adult & youth) differently, largely in accordance with established patriarchal norms and expectations.  Generally, women and girls are deemed to be subordinate to males, and thus, in circumstances of violent conflict, they are subject to victimization both by opposing (male) forces, but as well by the males on their own “side” of conflict.  Interestingly, women appear to have a significant role in efforts to reduce and eventually resolve conflict situations – or at least to bring about cease-fires.  This was certainly the case in the lead-up to the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, where women’s organizations articulated the necessity of ending the conflict and initiating forces of peace and reconciliation.  Ironically, however, there is a tendency for the discourse of patriarchy to re-assert itself in post-conflict governance, thus diminishing the voices of women and re-asserting norms of (often-times) violent masculinity as a basis of authority in post-conflict situations.  

c.What are the most compelling needs of women, girls and boys in the context of these new interconnections?
The most immediate need of vulnerable populations (women & children) during severe civil conflicts is to be protected from violence.  Invariably this requires the establishment of safe zones, such as refugee camps or areas where young people can sleep without fear of kidnapping or molestation (as in Uganda), and international peace-making – as opposed to “peace-keeping” – forces (that unfortunately are almost always either non-existent or far too sparse in number).  In the longer term, fundamental structural changes are required that allow for the participation of women, girls and boys in political discourse, both as a way to prevent the eruption of conflict and to assert post-conflict political reforms and accountability.  Much greater international effort should be directed as well at prosecuting leaders under whose authority the abuse of women and children has been perpetrated as a systematic aspect of conflict.

d.When considering these new interconnections, what have been the greatest failures in responding to the needs of women, girls and boys?
The lack of what I have outlined above (“c”).  Much lip-service is paid to the need to protect women and children from the excesses of civic conflict, but the “international community” has so far been unable & unwilling to muster the necessary political will and resources to live up to rhetorical commitments.

As stated at the outset, I am concerned that the ‘new wars’ thesis is somewhat overdrawn. While there may be changes to the configurations of the state and the inter-state system, it may be more helpful to think about the ways in which power, governance and conflict may echo old patterns rather than constituting something new. Second, some of the more emergent literature on Rwanda, Burundi and Darfur, for example, warns against the simple characterisation of these as ‘identity-based’ conflicts. The international community of institutions, states and policy entrepreneurs should always work to strengthen its knowledge and appreciation of power dynamics and conflict. But is there a danger that any attempt to typologize conflicts (and hence the responses needed) will lead inevitably to the simplification and misreading of conflicts?

3.Are there any opportunities for changing the way that policy makers and civil society actors respond to conflicts that arise out of these new interconnections (between identity, democratization, governance and armed conflict)?

Policy-makers in the country in which the conflict takes place, or policy-makers in a mediating or intervening country?

RESPONSE: Richard Maclure

To some extent, I have addressed this question in # 3 above.  However, further to the above comments, it is essential to create and expand legitimate forums of dialogue and decision-making that ensure that the interests of women and children/youth are accounted for in policy decisions and in the subsequent implementation of policy.  In this regard, serious consideration should be given to affirmative action policies that ensure proportional female representation in organs of governance (the legislatures of Norway and Sweden come to mind, as do recent UN-sponsored initiatives in West Africa to augment female representation in national legislatures).  Likewise, while the strength of labour unions has been considerably eroded as a result of economic globalization, there is a real need to re-conceptualize the structure and role of unions – changing from conventional male-dominated organizations, to associations that mobilize on behalf of the rights of working women and children (who often work in the shadows of the informal sector).  Similarly, the democratization of school classrooms, whereby children and youth are encouraged to discuss, question, and think critically, should be strongly encouraged as a fundamental benchmark of educational reform efforts.  In the long run, for civil society to function in ways that reduce the propensity of outright conflict and enhance the long-term likelihood of peaceful co-existence in post-conflict circumstances, it is essential to cultivate political and cultural change.  It is also important to encourage economic investments that generate job creation rather than capital-intensive inputs that aim simply for high profits.

Civil society can work to ensure that formal gains made in securing representation of, for example, women are continued into practice. The example of Afghanistan is pertinent here. After a high-profile commitment to the representation of women in the Afghan government, Western observers have said very little about the targeting and murder of female politicians and government workers. The ‘gender gains’ made in Afghanistan have almost all been killed off. Second, ongoing monitoring needs to be done to ensure that ‘a seat at the table’ actually means having voices represented and heard in a substantive way. It is not enough to simply have ‘women’ or ‘youth’ as a formal category of representation if more substantive issues are also not addressed. Gender and youth inequality is not simply a matter of lack of representation, and the gendered effects of democratization, governance and conflict are not simply issues of identity. The gendered and age-related impacts of these phenomena are structured through political, economic and social systems that are themselves problematic. ‘Representation’ is a very small part of how inequalities are manifest and maintained.

4.How can civil society work to ensure that women and/or children/youth have an active role in legitimate decision-making processes, particularly as relates to the prevention or resolution of conflict and the maintenance of peace?  What obstacles impede such efforts?

Advocating for quotas for women in parliament and for their representation in peace processes
Carrying out national consultations which survey men, women and youth before embarking on a peace process
Ensure leadership is shared by women and men in institutions (e.g. boards of directors of civil society institutions have fair representation between men and women)
Ensuring that domestic law contains provisions which give protects women’s equal rights
Ensuring multilateral institutions present in conflict or post-conflict zones have women and men in staff and leadership positions
Ensuring multilateral institutions make services equally accessible to women and men
Ensuring the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security are reflected in war-to-peace transitions.

To some extent, I have addressed this question in # 3 above.  However, further to the above comments, it is essential to create and expand legitimate forums of dialogue and decision-making that ensure that the interests of women and children/youth are accounted for in policy decisions and in the subsequent implementation of policy.  In this regard, serious consideration should be given to affirmative action policies that ensure proportional female representation in organs of governance (the legislatures of Norway and Sweden come to mind, as do recent UN-sponsored initiatives in West Africa to augment female representation in national legislatures).  Likewise, while the strength of labour unions has been considerably eroded as a result of economic globalization, there is a real need to re-conceptualize the structure and role of unions – changing from conventional male-dominated organizations, to associations that mobilize on behalf of the rights of working women and children (who often work in the shadows of the informal sector).  Similarly, the democratization of school classrooms, whereby children and youth are encouraged to discuss, question, and think critically, should be strongly encouraged as a fundamental benchmark of educational reform efforts.  In the long run, for civil society to function in ways that reduce the propensity of outright conflict and enhance the long-term likelihood of peaceful co-existence in post-conflict circumstances, it is essential to cultivate political and cultural change.  It is also important to encourage economic investments that generate job creation rather than capital-intensive inputs that aim simply for high profits.

War and conflict have long been recognized as times of ‘productive destruction’, in which new social, political and economic structures emerge out of the destruction caused by armed conflict.  But what is less clear is how the changes and adaptations that social structures evidence in periods of conflict will manifest and endure post-conflict. Anglo-Americans are, of course, all too familiar with the ways in which gender shifts in the labour market during world war II (iconically represented in the United States by ‘Rosie the Riveter’) were purposively ‘undone’ in the post war period. And in fact, the feminisation of the home and private sphere was arguably even more conservative in the post war period in Canada and the US then in the years leading up to world war II.  Equally, there are numerous example of post-colonial societies becoming more conservative in gender relations post-independence/post-conflict (for example, Algiers). And, the changes emerging out of conflict can themselves be quite conservative. For example, the evidence emerging out of Iraq is that women’s sexuality is increasingly targeted and regulated by informal militias, requiring what was once a largely secular society to adopt the dress and behaviour codes of particular religious ideologies.
   
As a generalized statement, in the period of destruction by armed conflict or even natural disasters, where traditional social arrangements are adapting to a changed environment, there is scope to work for a more equal society, for example. There are, however a number of potential problems. First and foremost, development NGOs have historically imposed themselves on social relations, despite best intentions, in ways that exacerbate rather than ameliorate gender inequalities, for example. The literature on the multiple ways this has happened is beyond the page limits of this exercise. However, suffice to say that a reoccurring problem are the assumptions made by NGOs and ‘experts’ about what are the manifestations and causes of inequality. Second, social relations are often closely entwined with economic and political structures. Pulling on one thread may cause unexpected impacts in other, related but underappreciated areas. Third, local governance as well as social arrangements are very rarely immune from outside developments. We should not assume that ‘inequalities’ are not themselves already shaped by actions by the international community. The local communities are not the only ones who may need to change their ‘traditional roles and hierarchies’.
   
Any role taken up by civil society should be primarily based in the local community, with as much community consultation as possible. Reducing layers of external governance in the funding state seems also imperative. Finally, civil society, particularly those with professional expertise, for example, in transitional justice, or rule of law building, need to ensure that they avail themselves of area and topic specialists.

5.Given that armed conflicts often force a shift in traditional roles and hierarchies (female or child-headed households, for example), does this represent an opening for changes in relations of power?  Does this represent an opportunity to support the development of models of local governance that integrate women and children’s rights?  How to support the development of such models in a way that is sustainable and resonate with local needs, realities and worldviews?

Absolutely. In fact, changes in power relations will have a much harder time being brought in “later on”. This often happens as the international community working in a post-conflict situation puts women’s rights on the backburner as something that is of less urgency and can be dealt with after other priorities. The most strategic time to integrate such changes is immediately following a conflict and in the beginning of a war-to-peace transition, where there may be a new regime in power, and where new political institutions are being erected.

Sustaining local governance models which include women means bringing women to the table at every opportunity and at every level of decision-making in a peace and democratization process, and making space for women activists lobbying and advocacy. It also means carrying out nation-wide consultations and needs assessments at the beginning which are equally inclusive of men and women. Finally, it means identifying local, already existing institutions which can be altered or built upon to include women’s participation and leadership.

The quick answer to the first two questions are:  “Yes!”  Unfortunately, however, what seems to occur time and time again are either missed opportunities, or opportunities that gradually fade when forces of “reconstruction” assert themselves over efforts to foster political, economic, and ideological “reform”.  This is exemplified by post-conflict education.  Generally, as conflicts draw to a close, much attention is directed towards the notion of education as a vehicle for generating peace, trauma-healing, etc.  Yet very quickly the focus shifts to one of acceleration – accelerating the construction and renovation of schools, levels of enrolment, production and distribution of textbooks, hiring and rapid training of teachers, etc. – and soon the same tried and true structures of “classical” competitive, selection-oriented schooling are reinstated.  I believe that in order to institute genuine long-term educational reform, and in a broader sense, to ensure the sustainability and relevence of alternative models of local governance in which women and youth are genuinely represented, international organizations (multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental) must work collaboratively in support of:  a) fundatmental institutional and organizational changes which are slow and often subject to resistance;  b) local institutional & political developments that allow for active engagement of women and youth in political discourse and economic exchanges;  and  c) regional and national policies and laws designed to entrench such changes in the actions and ultimately the consciousness of local people (male & female, of all age groups).

The role of international institutions, including international financial institutions, needs to be considered when assessing the causes and consequences of conflicts, but also the conditions necessary for ensuring the success of democratization or governance reform. There is a danger that the different international institutions, such as those promoting rule of law reform and those promoting particular visions of economic good governance, may be pulling in opposite directions particularly regarding the capacity of local state building.

6.What other critical areas or questions should be explored as relates to the intersection of identity, democratization, governance and armed conflict? 

The role of cultural and religious communities in empowering and disempowering women vis-a-vis rights given to them by the state, and in creating space for dialogue and conflict resolution.
The impact of women’s presence or absence from public space in shaping social perceptions of gender roles and norms.

As a university researcher, perhaps I can best answer this question by arguing on behalf of the role of research and evaluation which, because they focus on knowledge generation and information exchange, are cornerstones of accountability and democracy.  Researchers and the universities (and schools) in which they work have a significant role to play in seeking out the truths of what is working and what is not working vis à vis the advancement of the rights of women and children.  In effect, research and evaluation ought to be the handmaidens of social justice advocacy, and hence I would argue that the hopeful trends in action research, participatory research, participatory evaluation, and collaborative ties among researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners should continue to be strongly encouraged by granting agencies and by international donors.